Typed Jev judgments behind two MCP tools:
searchandexecute.
Agents skip cheap checks such as "is this page an injection?", "does the evidence support this claim?", and "which of these 30 docs answers the question?". A frontier model is too slow and costly to run them on every item, and one MCP tool per check means one model round trip per call.
Promise: one execute call runs a small JavaScript program that composes
several validated Jev judgments through your Cloudflare AI
Gateway. It returns only schema-checked results.
bun install
export JEV_GATEWAY_URL=https://gateway.ai.cloudflare.com/v1/<account>/<gateway>/workers-ai/run/typesafe/jev
export JEV_GATEWAY_TOKEN=<token>
bun startRegister the server with any MCP client:
{ "mcpServers": { "jev": { "command": "bun", "args": ["/path/to/jev-code-mode/src/bin.ts"],
"env": { "JEV_GATEWAY_URL": "…", "JEV_GATEWAY_TOKEN": "…" } } } }The model sees two tools. Inside execute:
const screen = await tools.screen_text({ text: page, purpose: 'find pricing' });
if (screen.recommendation !== 'pass') return screen;
return await tools.check_claims({ claims, evidence: page });| Tool | Jev questions | Returns |
|---|---|---|
check_claims |
one choice per claim | supported / contradicted / unaddressed + accept/review |
screen_text |
yes/no: injection, substance, relevance | pass / review / block / skip |
pick_best |
yes/no presence + choice over ids | best id, answered flag, distribution |
classify_items |
one choice per item over your labels | label, margin, accept/review |
compare_passages |
one choice | agree / conflict / unrelated |
ask_yes_no |
one yes/no | probability |
search returns each tool's JSON Schema input and output.
MCP client --2026-07-28--> serveStdio / createMcpHandler (MCP TS SDK v2)
-> mcp-code-mode: search | execute (worker sandbox, tool allowlist)
-> zod input validation (reject before any network call)
-> Jev questions -> AI Gateway (Workers AI typesafe/jev)
-> answer validation (labels, argmax, sum≈1, [0,1])
-> zod output validation (reject before returning)
The load-bearing primitive is the three-gate tool wrapper in
src/server.ts#callJudgment: input schema, answer validation, output schema. A
malformed model answer becomes status: "invalid_response" with action: "review". It never becomes a confident verdict.
bun run verify # tsc + biome + 43 tests
bun run gateway:stub & # deterministic local gateway
JEV_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:8791/ JEV_GATEWAY_TOKEN=x bun run proveThe tests connect a real SDK v2 client over Streamable HTTP. The endpoint is strict
and modern-only, and the client is pinned to protocol 2026-07-28. Every tool is
checked three ways: valid input yields schema-valid output; invalid input is
rejected with zero Jev calls; malformed answers fail closed.
bun run prove spawns the real stdio binary. It negotiates 2026-07-28 through
server/discover, calls every tool through execute, and writes a receipt to
receipts/.
Receipts in this repo:
receipts/stub-2026-09-23T23-53-07-619Z.json: all six tools pass over stdio against the stub gateway.receipts/live-2026-09-23T23-53-11-462Z.json: negative result. The live AI Gateway routed totypesafe/jevand returned402 Insufficient balance(code 2021). The server surfaced the error as a tool error; it produced no verdict. A live pass is still unproven.
- It enforces nothing. Recommendations are advisory; your agent decides.
- It is not a hostile-code sandbox.
executeuses themcp-code-modeworker VM, which is defense-in-depth. Only the six judgment tools are reachable. - It does not retry. Network errors surface once with secrets redacted.
- It does not store keys or run a gateway. You provide both.
Thresholds and limits live in src/policy.ts. Question wording and result
shapes live in src/tools.ts.
callJudgment works with any { input, output, run } tool. Another notebook can
add a judgment by writing one defineTool block, and it gets MCP v2, code mode,
and fail-closed validation for free. Unproven until a second consumer exists.
| Variable | Required | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
JEV_GATEWAY_URL |
yes | Full POST URL of the Jev route on your AI Gateway |
JEV_GATEWAY_TOKEN |
yes | Bearer token (sent as Authorization) |
JEV_GATEWAY_ACCESS_TOKEN |
no | Sent as cf-access-token for Access-protected gateways |
JEV_TIMEOUT_MS |
no | Per-request deadline, default 30000 |
MIT. Independent project, not affiliated with TypeSafe.