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The access_control plugin previously parsed and exposed a scope claim and supported the --invalid-scope-status-code configuration option, but AccessToken::validate() never evaluated the scope against incoming request paths. Consequently, any valid token authorized access to every resource covered by a remap rule, and setting --invalid-scope-status-code produced no effect.
This PR finishes the feature by implementing path-prefix scope validation on normalized path segments, providing per-resource granularity while remaining fully backward compatible with existing tokens.
Scope check in separate function after token validation
These choices are open to feedback; see Design Decisions section below.
Key Requirements & Design Decisions
Clean Separation of Concerns (Plumbing):
Kept AccessToken::validate() focused purely on token cryptographic integrity, semantics, and timing.
Implemented scope comparison as a separate helper function, validateScope(requestPath, scope), called in enforceAccessControl() immediately after token->validate() succeeds.
When out of scope, the transaction state is set to OUT_OF_SCOPE, correctly triggering --invalid-scope-status-code (default: 403) and suppressing subject header extraction.
Matching Semantics (Normalized Path Segments):
Matching is performed as a path-prefix on normalized segments.
Handles trailing slashes, redundant slashes, and ATS's TSUrlPathGet() format (which omits leading slashes).
Enforces directory segment boundaries so that a token scoped to /reports/ (or /reports) authorizes /reports/2026/ but strictly rejects sibling paths like /reports2/ or /reports_backup.
Backward Compatibility (Absent / Empty Scope):
An absent or empty scope claim is treated as unrestricted. Existing tokens in the field continue to function without disruption.
Resource Granularity vs Target Audience (sub claim):
Retains the existing model where sub represents target audience (e.g. frogs-in-a-well), while adding the missing per-resource granularity (e.g. scope="/reports/2026/").
Token builder & parser integration with addScope() / getScope()
Documentation (access_control.en.rst):
Replaced the note stating scope is "ignored by the current version of the plugin" with full documentation of the matching semantics, segment boundary rules, and status code behavior.
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The new enforcement branch is only exercised through direct validateScope() unit calls; the existing access-control AuTest does not send a scoped token through enforceAccessControl() or verify the configured out-of-scope status and subject-header suppression. Add an integration case for an in-scope and out-of-scope request so this transaction-level plumbing is protected.
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Clarified the description of the 'scope' parameter in the access control documentation.
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* ``ver`` for `version`_, `optional`, defaults to ``ver=1`` if not specified.
* ``scope`` for `scope`_, `optional`, ignored by the current version of the plugin, still not finalized (more applications and their use cases need to be studied to finalize the format)
* ``scope`` for `scope`_, `optional`. an absent or empty scope is unrestricted. Otherwise, it is a path-prefix restriction matched against normalized path segments, including the segment boundary (for example, ``/reports`` matches ``/reports/2026`` but not ``/reports2``); out-of-scope requests use the configured ``--invalid-scope-status-code``.
Corrected the wording in the validation function's documentation.
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Corrected capitalization and punctuation in the scope description for clarity.
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Fixes #13607
Summary
The
access_controlplugin previously parsed and exposed ascopeclaim and supported the--invalid-scope-status-codeconfiguration option, butAccessToken::validate()never evaluated the scope against incoming request paths. Consequently, any valid token authorized access to every resource covered by a remap rule, and setting--invalid-scope-status-codeproduced no effect.This PR finishes the feature by implementing path-prefix scope validation on normalized path segments, providing per-resource granularity while remaining fully backward compatible with existing tokens.
Design Approach (per #13607 suggestion)
This PR implements the minimal backward-compatible approach:
These choices are open to feedback; see Design Decisions section below.
Key Requirements & Design Decisions
Clean Separation of Concerns (Plumbing):
AccessToken::validate()focused purely on token cryptographic integrity, semantics, and timing.validateScope(requestPath, scope), called inenforceAccessControl()immediately aftertoken->validate()succeeds.OUT_OF_SCOPE, correctly triggering--invalid-scope-status-code(default: 403) and suppressing subject header extraction.Matching Semantics (Normalized Path Segments):
TSUrlPathGet()format (which omits leading slashes)./reports/(or/reports) authorizes/reports/2026/but strictly rejects sibling paths like/reports2/or/reports_backup.Backward Compatibility (Absent / Empty Scope):
scopeclaim is treated as unrestricted. Existing tokens in the field continue to function without disruption.Resource Granularity vs Target Audience (
subclaim):subrepresents target audience (e.g.frogs-in-a-well), while adding the missing per-resource granularity (e.g.scope="/reports/2026/").What Changed
Core Matching Logic (access_control.cc, access_control.h):
validateScope(StringView requestPath, StringView scope).normalizePath()to ensure leading slashes, collapse consecutive slashes, and normalize trailing slashes.@todocomments regarding scope validation.Transaction Enforcement (plugin.cc):
enforceAccessControl(), extracted the request path viaTSUrlPathGet()and validated it againsttoken->getScope().data->_vaState = OUT_OF_SCOPEand invokeshandleInvalidToken().Unit Tests (test_access_control.cc):
/reports/reports)/reports/reports/2026/annual.pdf)/reportsvs/reports2"/")addScope()/getScope()scopeis "ignored by the current version of the plugin" with full documentation of the matching semantics, segment boundary rules, and status code behavior.Future Work
/reports/{year}/)example.com:/reports/)These can be added in follow-ups once the core prefix matching is proven.
Verification
./build/plugins/experimental/access_control/unit_tests/test_access_controlcmake --build build -t format