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Prepare the dependency graph; consumer adaptations and validation follow before publication. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Co-Authored-By: Claude GPT-6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Preserve compact signing and compressed public-key encodings at the FFI boundary. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Exercise multiple digests to detect accidental low-R signature grinding. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Preserve consensus ECDSA parsing, verification and error strings through DPP-owned validation using the unchanged secp256k1 backend. Adapt SDK and binding key ownership and add historical signature and malformed-input regressions. Co-Authored-By: Claudius the Magnificent <claudius@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude GPT-6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude GPT-6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Remove the local compatibility adapter while preserving signature acceptance, key encodings and fee operations. Adopt upstream diagnostic text and error precedence; these descriptions are carried in ABCI info, outside the Tenderdash results hash. Co-Authored-By: OpenAI Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Preserve non-grinding signatures, SEC1 parser acceptance and compressed encodings. Keep direct secp256k1 dependencies only for ECDH primitives and compatibility tests. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
<sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Use Core typed keys and signatures throughout non-ECDH consumers, retaining raw primitives only at the encryption boundary and in compatibility tests. Preserve seeded key generation, compact signature bytes, and validation outcomes with differential and historical-vector coverage. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub> Co-Authored-By: Codex GPT-6 <noreply@openai.com>
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✅ Final review complete — no blockers (commit 1da375b) · triage: critical |
Take the committed preservation snapshot before releasing the SwiftData container and context so their teardown cannot race the source read lock. Keep the migration and all thirteen field-preservation assertions unchanged. <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
Walkthrough
Merge Risk:
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Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The migration preserves the reviewed typed-key, signing, parsing, and seeded-generation behavior, and no blocking correctness or consensus defects were identified. Two non-blocking suggestions remain: track the missing typed ECDH capability upstream and avoid leaving an unzeroized raw ECDH key in the newly added test provider. Kotlin CI is passing; PR Hygiene remains pending, and no local builds or tests were run in this static-review lane.
🟡 2 suggestion(s)
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 3: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 4: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 6: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 7: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.1-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.1-sol(effort low) — This is a large, cross-cutting cryptography and key-handling migration that changes signature generation, parsing, derivation, validation, and FFI/WASM consumers across protocol and wallet code. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(lane failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.1-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.1-sol— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— architecture-layering (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— ffi-engineer (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— platform-versioning (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.1-sol— security-auditor (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review. Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In `packages/rs-sdk/Cargo.toml`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-sdk/Cargo.toml:7-8: Track typed ECDH support in the upstream crypto owner
The direct raw `secp256k1` dependency is a reasonable compatibility bridge because the pinned and current rust-dashcore/base-sdk revisions do not expose typed ECDH. However, this migration now leaves raw-key interfaces or scalar conversions across the SDK, wallet, and bindings without a linked upstream tracking issue. Create or link an issue in the owning crypto project for typed constant-time ECDH APIs covering both platform-encryption's hashed shared-secret convention and DashConnect's raw shared-X convention; the consumers can then migrate without exporting and reparsing scalars.
In `packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/contact_requests.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/network/contact_requests.rs:211-215: Erase the raw ECDH secret created by the test provider
This newly added `SeedCryptoProvider` path converts the typed key's scalar into a raw `secp256k1::SecretKey` and passes it directly to ECDH. That raw key is not zeroized when the call returns, unlike the `WipingSecretKey` guards used by the other raw-ECDH paths. Although this provider is test-only, it introduces a secret-handling pattern that can be copied into production code; wrap the temporary raw key in the same erasure guard before calling `derive_shared_key_ecdh`.
…ypto-core-consumers Bring in v5.1-dev, which squash-merged the stacked parent #5514 as 3a731bf. Conflicts were resolved by re-merging with the #5514 tip (d14aa58) as the merge base: the squash is byte-identical to that tip apart from the rust-dashcore pin bump, so this applies exactly the #5519 delta on top of v5.1-dev. Semantic fixes: - A plain merge against the original fork point silently re-added the squash's `pub use secp256k1` re-export and production `secp256k1` dependency to rs-dpp, plus `dpp::secp256k1` imports in platform-wallet (masternode locator), rs-sdk-ffi (cast_vote, mnemonic resolver core signer) and wasm-sdk (encrypted_for). Those are dropped again, so DPP keeps no production raw secp256k1 dependency. - rs-sdk dashpay/profile, dpns_usernames and put_document: keep base's new ResponseMetadata/ContextProvider/StateTransition imports and move the RNG imports from `dpp::secp256k1::rand` to `dpp::dashcore::key::rand`. - Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock: base's dependency pins, plus only #5519's per-crate secp256k1 moves; cargo accepts the lock with --locked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Update: #5643 and #5639 were closed in favour of #5637, so this PR now waits for #5637. #5637 moves rust-dashcore to Once #5637 merges, merge 🤖 Co-authored by Claudius the Magnificent AI Agent |
…-consumers # Conflicts: # Cargo.lock # packages/rs-dpp/Cargo.toml
`high_s_twin` (dpp fixtures, built under `fixtures-and-mocks`) negated S through the raw `secp256k1` crate, which dpp no longer depends on outside tests; compute `n - S` over the big-endian bytes instead. The multiple choice proposal builder imported `rand` through the removed `dpp::secp256k1` re-export; use `dpp::dashcore::key::rand` like the other SDK builders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
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Waiting for bot review — thepastaclaw not yet. Wait for the missing reviews, or a writer can post |
The asset lock signer parsed the wallet's compact signature and recovered its key with raw `secp256k1` types, although Core exposes `EcdsaRecSignature` and `EcdsaPublicKey::recover`. Use them; the header check, recovered key and returned signature bytes are unchanged. Raw `secp256k1` stays only for ECDH and as the test oracle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
…typed migration Core's typed `EcdsaPublicKey::verify` normalizes S, so a third party could turn a valid auto-accept proof into a second, high-S proof that verified. The raw `secp256k1` verify this replaced refused it; check `is_low_s()` first to keep the accepted set unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
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Waiting for bot review — thepastaclaw not yet. Wait for the missing reviews, or a writer can post |
…d simple-signer dpp's random key generators, drive-abci's test helpers and simple-signer each re-implemented `secp256k1::SecretKey::new`'s rejection sampling to keep seeded keys and RNG consumption unchanged. Keep one copy in `dpp::util::ecdsa::random_secret_key`, with a test against the raw constructor, until rust-dashcore exposes an RNG-parameterized one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
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Waiting for bot review — thepastaclaw not yet. Wait for the missing reviews, or a writer can post |
…er wipe comment `sign_with_core_signer` lost the reason it searches recovery ids and keeps the signer's bytes (non-grinding nonce, low-S). The invitation flow said `EcdsaSecretKey` has no drop-time zeroize; it has one, and the explicit wipe exists to clear the key before an encode error propagates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC <sub>🤖 Co-authored by [Claudius the Magnificent](https://github.com/lklimek/claudius) AI Agent</sub>
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/self-reviewed |
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Re-review — Final validation — Phase 1 + Phase 2
The typed ECDSA migration remains behavior-preserving across key generation, signatures, recovery, parsing, and low-S enforcement, with no in-scope blocking correctness or consensus issue identified. One non-blocking architecture suggestion remains: track the missing parameterized typed RNG constructor in rust-dashcore so the local compatibility sampler can eventually be removed. Available CI reports no failed code checks; the review check is queued and PR Hygiene is still pending.
🟡 1 suggestion(s)
Approved: nothing here blocks the merge. The non-blocking findings are optional: fix them forward, in this PR or a follow-up, without waiting for another review round.
Review provenance
Source: reviewer 1: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 2: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: general); reviewer 3: muse-spark-1.3-contributor (agent: phase1-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 4: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: architecture-layering); reviewer 5: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: ffi-engineer); reviewer 6: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: platform-versioning); reviewer 7: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: rust-quality); reviewer 8: gpt-6.2-astra (agent: phase2-reviewer, role: security-auditor); final verifier: gpt-6.2-sol (agent: sol-verifier, role: final-verifier)
- Triage:
criticalbygpt-6.2-sol(effort low) — The 73-file migration changes production signing and key handling, including DPP state-transition signing and high-S rejection inverify_auto_accept_proof_with_pubkey, where preserving exact bytes and accepted inputs requires careful review. - Phase 1 reviewers:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— general (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer,muse-spark-1.3-contributor— rust-quality (completed, effort xhigh); agentphase1-reviewer - Phase 1 model:
muse-spark-1.3-contributor— not quota-gated; passed overgemini-3.8-flash-high(antigravity quota lookup failed),glm-5.3-flash(not used above high effort; tier asks max) - Single stage: Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviewed this head side by side, with no blocker gate between them (triage tier)
- Fresh verifier:
gpt-6.2-sol— final-verifier; agentsol-verifier - Phase 2 reviewers:
gpt-6.2-astra— general (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.2-astra— architecture-layering (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.2-astra— ffi-engineer (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.2-astra— platform-versioning (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.2-astra— rust-quality (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer,gpt-6.2-astra— security-auditor (completed, effort high); agentphase2-reviewer
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
These findings are from an automated code review (PastaClaw). How to work through them:
- Verify each finding against the code; fix only what is real, as narrowly as the finding.
- If a finding is wrong, decline it on its thread in one or two sentences; the bot answers once and stops.
- To defer one, link a tracking issue on its thread (or reply asking the bot to file one).
- Suggestions don't block the merge, but most are worth fixing in this PR; judge each on its merits.
- Keep the PR's scope; don't grow it to satisfy hardening suggestions.
- Carried items were raised in an earlier round: read the thread first, and don't re-fix what you already fixed, declined or deferred there. Disputed and deferred items are already handled and are not listed.
In `packages/rs-dpp/src/util/ecdsa/random_secret_key.rs`:
- [SUGGESTION] packages/rs-dpp/src/util/ecdsa/random_secret_key.rs:4-8: Track the typed RNG constructor in rust-dashcore
This helper locally reimplements secp256k1 rejection sampling because rust-dashcore exposes only a thread-RNG `EcdsaSecretKey::generate()`, while the underlying dash-pkc API already has a parameterized `generate(rng, compression)` constructor. The local implementation is currently needed to preserve seeded RNG output and consumption, but that compatibility logic belongs with the crypto owner and can drift from the upstream implementation. Add an upstream rust-dashcore issue or PR for exposing the parameterized constructor, then replace this helper with that API when available.
Out-of-scope follow-up suggestions (1)
These are valid observations, but they are outside this PR's scope and should be handled in separate issues or author/maintainer-requested PRs rather than blocking this review.
- Make wasm-dpp2 public-key setter failure-atomic — The
set_innersetter updatescompressedbefore its fallible key parse, so an invalid input can leave the wrapper's encoding flag inconsistent with its unchanged key. This behavior predates #5519 and is not part of the mechanical migration, but it should be fixed because it can corrupt wrapper state after an error.- Follow-up: #5979
| /// Draws a secret key from `rng` exactly as `secp256k1::SecretKey::new` does: 32 bytes at a time | ||
| /// until they form a valid scalar. Seeded callers get the same keys, and leave `rng` in the same | ||
| /// state, as before the typed key migration. | ||
| // TODO: replace with Core's RNG-parameterized constructor once rust-dashcore exposes one | ||
| // (dash-pkc already has `EcdsaSecretKey::generate(rng, compressed)`). |
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🟡 Suggestion: Track the typed RNG constructor in rust-dashcore
This helper locally reimplements secp256k1 rejection sampling because rust-dashcore exposes only a thread-RNG EcdsaSecretKey::generate(), while the underlying dash-pkc API already has a parameterized generate(rng, compression) constructor. The local implementation is currently needed to preserve seeded RNG output and consumption, but that compatibility logic belongs with the crypto owner and can drift from the upstream implementation. Add an upstream rust-dashcore issue or PR for exposing the parameterized constructor, then replace this helper with that API when available.
source: gpt-6.2-astra (phase2-reviewer: architecture-layering)
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Ready for review — files with no dedicated owner: QuantumExplorer or shumkov · |
TL;DR
Dash Platform's protocol library (DPP) stops depending on the raw
secp256k1crate. Its consumers use rust-dashcore's typed keys and signatures instead. Signature bytes and key-generation output stay the same.Detailed discussion
Targets
v5.2-dev. #5979 is stacked on this PR.Issue being fixed or feature implemented
DPP exposed a raw secp256k1 backend (
dpp::secp256k1) after the typed Core migration in #5514. Consumers imported it through DPP, which coupled protocol code to client encryption and low-level backend types.What was done?
secp256k1dependency to dev-dependencies and removedpp::secp256k1.secp256k1dependencies only at ECDH boundaries in SDK/wallet/bindings; the C++ binding's asset lock signer recovers its key through Core's typedEcdsaRecSignature/EcdsaPublicKey::recover. Neither the pinned nor the current Core typed API exposes ECDH; it is tracked in feat(pkc): typed ECDH on secp256k1 keys base-sdk#137. platform-encryption is unchanged.secp256k1as a test oracle where byte compatibility is asserted.v5.2-devadded since the previous merge:dpp::tests::utils::high_s_twin(fixtures-and-mocks) computesn - Sover bytes, because the pinned Core API has no scalar negation;randfromdpp::dashcore::key::rand.Behavior changes beyond the type swap
EcdsaError. This changes the text of FFI/JS errors and ofProtocolError::Genericerrors, but not their codes or types.verifyaccepts high-S signatures, soverify_auto_accept_proof_with_pubkeychecksis_low_s()to keep refusing them as the raw backend did. A test covers it.Non-mechanical changes to review
Everything else is a 1:1 type or path swap. Line links point to the PR diff.
auto_accept.rs:244-253verifyplusis_low_s()guardkey_type.rs:214,key_type.rs:240,public_key.rs:43-59,secp256k1_primitives.rs:28-44EcdsaErrordip14.rs:119-131SecretKey→Scalarround trip; wrong-length IL maps toInvalidKeykey_generation.rs:90-97PrivateKey::from_byte_arrayalready validateskey_generation.rs:217-222sign_recoverable().signature(), because Core'ssigngrinds low-Rauto_accept.rs:153-157mod.rs:2320-2369sign_with_core_signerrecovery-id search rewritten on typed recovery; the byte-parity rationale comment is keptrandom_secret_key.rs:1-35, used bysigner.rs:104dpp::util::ecdsa::random_secret_key, does rejection sampling of a secret key from a seeded RNG (as rawSecretKey::new), with a TODO to switch to Core once rust-dashcore exposes an RNG-parameterized constructor. dpp's generators and drive-abci's test helpers call it tooSecretKey::new)utils.rs:192-198WipingSecretKeyremoved; the typed key zeroizes on dropsecp256k1_primitives.rs:116-123invitation.rs:262-271,invitation.rs:257non_secure_erase→zeroize; the typed key also zeroizes on drop, the explicit wipe clears it before an encode error propagatesutils.rs:277-2801·Gmod.rs:289-315high_s_twinfixture computesn - Sover bytes (Core has no scalar negation)signer.rs:126-166In-place changes to shipped generations
IdentityPublicKeyV0::validate_private_key_byteskeeps the same behavior: scalar acceptance, compressed public-key derivation and HASH160 comparison. KeyType v0 generators keep the same scalar bytes, public-key/hash bytes and RNG consumption; differential tests cover 64 seeds and three key types. Drive edits inside v0 modules are test/helper changes. No version table, consensus rule, fee schedule, wire format or storage schema changes.Breaking Changes
Rust API changes:
dpp::secp256k1re-export.ContactCryptoProvider::export_auto_accept_private_keyandexport_invitation_private_key, andAutoAcceptProofSource::SignWithKey.secret_key, use CoreEcdsaSecretKey.ParsedInvitation.voucher_keyand key arguments toencode_invitation_uri,voucher_output_indexandvoucher_credit_outputuse Core keys.verify_auto_accept_proof_with_pubkeytakesEcdsaPublicKey.ECDH interfaces keep the same underlying raw types through direct dependencies. C ABI and JavaScript signatures are unchanged; error message text changes as described above.
How Has This Been Tested?
Compatibility coverage: 64 seeded identity/address-key cases, 64 auto-accept signing cases, 32 messages with both WIF encodings, and compressed/uncompressed/hybrid SEC1 parser contracts (
dppecdsa_compatibilityandhistorical_hash_compatibility,should_preserve*tests in simple-signer, platform-wallet, wasm-sdk and wasm-dpp2).On the current head:
cargo test -p dpp --lib --test ecdsa_compatibility -- high_s ecdsa: 31 + 4 passed, including the newhigh_s_twintests and the high-S refusal paths.cargo test -p platform-wallet --lib auto_accept: 21 passed, including the high-S refusal.cargo test -p dash-sdk-cxx --lib signer: 1 passed.cargo test -p dpp --lib --test ecdsa_compatibility --features random-public-keys: the seeded generator tests pass, includingrandom_secret_keyagainst rawSecretKey::new.cargo test -p simple-signer --lib --features state-transitions should_preserve: 1 passed.cargo clippy -p dpp -p simple-signer -p drive-abci --all-targets -- --no-deps -D warningsandcargo clippy -p simple-signer --all-targets --features state-transitions -- --no-deps -D warnings: clean.cargo clippy -p dpp -p dash-sdk -p wasm-dpp2 --all-targets -- -D warnings: clean.cargo clippy -p dash-sdk-cxx --all-targets -- --no-deps -D warnings: clean.cargo clippy -p platform-wallet --lib -- -D warnings: clean forplatform-wallet. It reports dead code indash-sdkandplatform-wallettest targets under the reduced feature set, in files this PR does not touch.Checklist:
structure.rs, regeneratedgrovedb-structure.json, and checked the structure viewer link posted on this pull request🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01WunYYijwZNbw3EjHtdMAHC
🤖 Co-authored by Claudius the Magnificent AI Agent
PR Hygiene ·
1da375bCargo.lock,packages/rs-scripts/src/bin/register_identity.rs,packages/rs-sdk-cxx/Cargo.tomland 7 more) — QuantumExplorer or shumkovdpp(packages/rs-dpp/Cargo.toml,packages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/key_type.rs,packages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v0/methods/mod.rsand 8 more) — QuantumExplorer or shumkovrs-drive-abci(packages/rs-drive-abci/examples/generate_wasm_contract_cache_vectors.rs,packages/rs-drive-abci/examples/generate_wasm_state_transition_wait_vectors.rs,packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/check_tx/v0/mod.rsand 4 more) — QuantumExplorer or shumkovrs-platform-wallet-ffi(packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/Cargo.toml,packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/contact_request.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet-ffi/src/dashpay.rsand 4 more) — HashEngineering or ZocoLini or llbartekll or romchornyirs-platform-wallet(packages/rs-platform-wallet/Cargo.toml,packages/rs-platform-wallet/examples/dpns_marketplace_testnet.rs,packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/masternode/locator.rsand 12 more) — HashEngineering or ZocoLini or llbartekll or romchornyirust-sdk-ffi— you own itrust-sdk— you own itjs-wasm-sdk(packages/wasm-sdk/Cargo.toml,packages/wasm-sdk/src/encrypted_for.rs,packages/wasm-sdk/src/private_contact_requests.rsand 3 more) — shumkovWhen every merge requirement is met, the
PR Hygienecheck passes. Reviewer limits do not block merging; other required GitHub checks and protections still apply.Summary by CodeRabbit