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Hosted Home: run in a confidential VM that the user's client verifies by attestation #212

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@andersalm

Part of #209 (user keys and private data that the host cannot read).

Signatures prove what code was published, not what code a server runs: root on the host can run a different binary or read process memory. A confidential VM or enclave (for example AMD SEV-SNP or Intel TDX) keeps memory unreadable to the host, and remote attestation proves which build runs. A plain VM per user separates users from each other, not from the operator.

Done means

  • The hosted Runtime runs in a confidential VM or enclave on hardware or a cloud that supports it; the choice and its cost are recorded here.
  • Its attestation names the exact signed ElastOS build (release hash and maintainer DID). The user's client (from the hosted client issue) checks the attestation before releasing any key. Test: a modified build, or a VM without valid attestation, receives no key.
  • The docs state what the operator can still do (deny service, see traffic sizes and timing) and what it cannot (read keys or private data).

Activity

  1. added this to the After 0.8.0 milestone on Oct 2, 2026
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